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Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai Opposing the Neoliberal Policy in the Kulon Progo Coastal Area

Perlawanan Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai terhadap Kebijakan Neoliberal di Pesisir Kabupaten Kulon Progo

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ABSTRACT: The Government of Kulon Progo Regency and Jogja Magasa Iron, Ltd. announced its sand iron mining plan to the coastal community in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta in 2006. The coastal farmers refused the plan due to the loss of agricultural land required for mining, as well as its subsequent impacts on the environment and livelihoods and established *Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai* (PPLP) or the "Coastal Farmers Union" to fight the government's mining plan. The PPLP developed social movements in the coastal areas through rallies, information campaigns, and networking with national and international NGOs. In 2014, the government postponed the mining plan, the future of which remained unclear today. From the initial rejection of the mining proposal, the resistance movement expanded to resist all forms of policy involving coastal land grabbing. The article argues that PPLP's resistance is a reaction to extractivism developed by the state and public sector. The issue reflects the fifth premise of Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory, that accumulation by dispossession encourages struggles. The Indonesian political economy set up the extractivism process that occurred in the context of the sand iron mining plan in Kulon Progo. The mining plan is part of a land grabbing process that provokes the PPLP resistance movement. This study aims to describe the struggle of the PPLP to sustain the coastal land as coastal farming over the neoliberal policy related to mining plans.

ABSTRAK: *Pemerintah Kabupaten Kulon Progo dan PT Jogja Magasa Iron mensosialisasikan rencana penambangan pasir besi pada Masyarakat pesisir di Kulon Progo Yogyakarta pada tahun 2006. Petani lahan pantai menolak rencana penambangan tersebut karena penambangan akan merampas lahan pertanian mereka. Penambangan juga akan merusak lingkungan hidup di sekitar pantai dan merampas penghidupan petani lahan pantai. Maka, petani lahan pantai mendirikan Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai (PPLP) sebagai sarana melawan rencana penambangan yang digencarkan oleh pemerintah. PPLP membangun gerakan sosial di wilayah pesisir melalui konvoi, menyebarkan informasi perlawanan, dan membangun jejaring dengan LSM dalam dan luar negeri. Pada tahun 2014, pemerintah menunda rencana penambangan tersebut, yang sampai saat ini belum jelas kelanjutannya. Dari awalnya melawan rencana penambangan, gerakan perlawanan meluas untuk melawan semua bentuk kebijakan yang berpotensi merampas lahan pantai. Penelitian ini berpendapat bahwa perlawanan PPLP merupakan respons terhadap ekstraktivisme yang dikembangkan oleh negara dan sektor swasta. Isu perlawanan tersebut merefleksikan premis kelima teori akumulasi dengan perampasan buah pikir Harvey, bahwa akumulasi dengan perampasan mendorong perlawanan. Ekonomi politik di Indonesia membangun proses ekstraktivisme yang mana terjadi pada rencana penambangan pasir besi di Kulon Progo. Rencana penambangan pasir besi tersebut merupakan bagian dari upaya perampasan tanah yang memprovokasi munculnya gerakan perlawanan PPLP. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan perlawanan PPLP untuk mempertahankan lahan pantai sebagai lahan pertanian sebagai bentuk perlawanan terhadap kebijakan neoliberal, khususnya rencana penambangan.*

Keywords: extractivism, accumulation by dispossession, farmer resistance, PPLP, coastal area

Kata Kunci: *Ekstraktivisme, akumulasi dengan perampasan, perlawanan petani, PPLP, lahan pantai*

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1. Introduction

Indonesia can be classified as an extractive state where the economic system and the mode of production incorporate extractivism. Chagnon et. al.[1] argued that extractivism is a system of oppression, violence, resource depletion, and non-reciprocity that is supported and justified by an interlocking web of practices, mentalities, and power differentials. Extractivism can be destructive for social life and ecology. Furthermore, the state has historically oppressed citizens to support extractive industries for economic development purposes.

The Indonesian political economy generally comprises four periods: the colonial era, the state-owned era, the marketization era, and the democratization era. The extractive economy can be examined from the perspective of the Indonesian political economy since the colonial era, when the Indonesian extractive economy was first established. Using mercantilism, the *Vereenig-de Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC) applied a pure extractive economy in monopolizing spice trading from 1800 to 1900. The Dutch East Indies Government continued the extractive economy through a modern extractive system by implementing a cultivation system in the period of 1815-1830. Post-independence, the Indonesian political economy inherited a colonial nature, such as exports dominated by raw materials, imports dominated by consumer goods, and the financial market used by foreign investors to rotate their excess capital.[2] The colonial nature of the political economy continued in the marketization and democratization eras when the government exercised liberalism and neoliberalism, inviting foreign capital and leaning on foreign loans from international financial institutions.

Over-reliance on exports of raw materials has led to multiple contemporary agrarian and rural conflicts in Indonesia, where populations living in areas earmarked for extractive industries or export-oriented development projects have resisted state plans. One of the agrarian conflict cases occurred in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, Indonesia where the coastal farmers' union *Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai* (PPLP) refused the state's sand iron mining plan. The mining plan was promoted by the government of Kulon Progo Regency and Jogja Magasa Iron, Ltd. in 2006. The government and the company shared the plan with the coastal community. The coastal farmers rejected the mining plan because mining would take over coastal land, which is key to their primary source of livelihood – farming and livestock raising. Based on the mining plan contracts, the concession area is 2,987.79 hectares, covering Banaran and Karangsewu villages in Galur district, Garongan and Bugel villages in Panjatan district, and Karangwuni village in Wates district. Despite the community's refusal the government continued the project, triggering resistance from coastal communities.

The conflict arose due to differences in coastal land use interests between the government and coastal communities. According to interviews with the Government of Kulon Progo Regency, coastal land has the potential for high-value sand iron. Thus, if the sand iron is mined and processed in Kulon Progo Regency, it will boost local income, create new jobs in the industrial processing sector, and prompt the economic development of Kulon Progo. The coastal farmers rejected the mining plan on multiple fronts: 1) farmers have worked hard since 1984 to transform barren coastal land into productive agricultural land; 2) the coastal farmers do not acknowledge the ownership right of the Puro Pakualaman Duchy (the property of the royal family of Yogyakarta Kingdom) on the coastal land.

Legally, the Royal family's claim to land ownership was strengthened by Law No. 13 of 2012 on the Privileges of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Undang-Undang Keistimewaan*/UUK Yogyakarta 2012), which confirmed their status as hereditary rulers and delineated between the crown's personal and state holdings. The coastal community believes that the coastal land is state land, rather than the personal property of the royal family and rejects the royal family's claim over the land. Following the provisions in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 1960 concerning Basic Regulations of Agrarian Principles or *Undang-*

[1] Christopher W. Chagnon et al., "From Extractivism to Global Extractivism: The Evolution of an Organizing Concept," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 49, no. 4 (2022): 760–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2022.2069015.
[2] R. Baswir, *Bahaya Neoliberalisme*, 2009 (Pustaka Pelajar, 2009).

Undang Pokok Agraria (BAL 1960/UUPA 1960), state land can potentially become individual property after more than 20 years of cultivation by the community. The coastal farmers believe the coastal land is theirs because they live near the land and cultivate the land for their livelihood for decades, though they do not have a land certificate. They have no desire to certify the land because they only want to cultivate the land as a source of livelihood. Conversely, the government argues that coastal land is owned by the Puro Pakualaman Duchy (PPD) as a Royal institution.

In 2007, the coastal farmers unified into PPLP, dramatically increasing their resistance to the mining project. The PPLP organizes the coastal farmers to combat the government by protesting and demonstrating, boycotting some government programs, fighting with prayers, and reclaiming land. They also built a network with grassroots civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and journalists to advocate their struggle. The conflict escalated during 2010 – 2012, from a vertical conflict to a horizontal conflict. Over time, the conflict has created disintegration and social exclusion in the coastal community, destroying social norms. The conflict ended around 2014 when the mining plan was postponed, and its future and legal status remains unclear until today. However, the PPLP continued their fight. They built networks with other farmers' unions and advocated similar cases.

Farmers' resistance is a classic social problem in many parts of the world. The PPLP, in the context of the sand iron mining plan conflict in Indonesia, faced challenges in maintaining their resistance but ultimately continued. This article asks: How has the PPLP maintained and sustained its resistance despite the postponement of the mining plan?

2. Method

Research for this article was conducted in sand iron mining planned concessions: Wates, Panjatan, and Galur subdistricts in Kulon Progo Regency, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, from May to August 2024. The research employed a qualitative research method, utilizing a single case study approach to focus on contemporary events. A case study can engage people with the experience of the case or provide a rich portrayal of an event, project, or program.[3] An explanatory case study looks for causal factors to describe a specific phenomenon. The primary focus of such a case study is to explain why and how certain conditions occur, that is, why particular sequences of events occur or do not occur.[4] The explanatory case study of PPLP details farmer resistance as a particular phenomenon in the mining plan's context.

To build the case, the research employs semi-structured one-to-one in-depth interviews, direct and naturalistic observation, and document analysis. Interviews were conducted with 53 informants who were PPLP actors, members and related stakeholders. The informants from the PPLP were part of the PPLP management, PPLP members, and male or female farmers, aged 40 years and above who were involved in the mining plan conflict from the beginning (the year 2006 or earlier). The interviews were conducted over two or more hours through a single sitting or multiple sitting, using Javanese (the researcher's and informants' mother tongue language) to build rapport and gain trust.[5] Informants were asked about their interpretations, opinions, insights, explanations, and meanings related to their resistance.

Observations were conducted through direct and naturalistic observations. Naturalistic observation is critical in highly politicized environments, like in this case, where individuals in an interview may try to elude the "truth" or press the interviewer that their view is the "right" view of the situation. Observations were carried

[3] Patricia Leavy, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199811755.001.0001.

[4] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*, 6th Ed (SAGE Publications, 2018).

[5] Rebecca Marschan-Piekkari and Cristina Reis, "Language and Languages in Cross-Cultural Interviewing," in *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for International Business*, ed. Rebecca Marschan-Piekkari and Catherine Welch (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781954331.00027.

out during the PPLP activities when they gathered to celebrate the PPLP 18th years anniversary to express their resistance. Moreover, interviews and observations were supported by document analysis by gathering and copying relevant documents and news from the media. Documentation establishing what historical antecedents might exist provides a springboard for contemporary data gathering. The researcher made field notes after finishing every fieldwork trip to record the data. If the informants refused to be recorded, the researcher did not record the interviews to provide a safe environment for the informants to reveal information about their struggles.[6]

3. Findings and Discussion

3.1. Accumulation by Dispossession and Resistance

This study utilizes Accumulation by Dispossession (ABD) and the concept of resistance to interpret the data. ABD is used to understand the Indonesian political economy, which operates under extractive regimes, providing the general background for the PPLP resistance. Moreover, the resistance concepts are employed to understand how the PPLP maintains its resistance from 2006 to the present (2024).

Harvey[7] introduced the concept of ABD as the result of a thorough examination of capitalist discourses. He draws on the dual concepts of capital accumulation, as presented by Rosa Luxemburg (1913), and primitive Accumulation, as outlined by Karl Marx, to develop the ABD theory. Drawing on the dual nature of the capital accumulation concept, Harvey argued that economic processes are characterized by political violence and power contestation, and ABD provides a means of understanding contemporary capitalism.

ABD theory provides five main premises.[8] The premises are that 1) ABD can contribute to addressing the overaccumulation issues present in contemporary capitalism, 2) ABD is a contingency, 3) privatization is the cutting edge of ABD, 4) ABD encourages struggles, and 5) the struggle between anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist has dual domains. This research applies the ABD theory to explain Indonesia's political economy, particularly in the context of the extractive regime, and how it is intertwined with farmer resistance.

The resistance concept is used to examine the PPLP resistance as a reaction to dispossession at the grassroots level. To explain why the PPLP can sustain its resistance, this research applies to the concept of resistance as provided by Fletcher,[9] Hollander and Einwohner,[10] and Baaz *et al.*.[11] Fletcher[12] believed that resistance is a product of power and strongly linked to power. Resistance is a function of power as an effort to build an arena of power in which subordinates are allowed to realize the dominance that needs to be resisted. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend how such arenas are established and how subalterns can be empowered to fight back. Power is always present in social relations, so there is always resistance to that power.

Resistance dimensions promoted by Baaz et al.[13] can be used to describe how the PPLP manages and operates its resistance. They argued that resistance has dimensions, including configuration of power, spectrum (individual or collective), temporal aspect, spatial dimension, relationship between the body and the representation and resistance reinforces new resistance performance.[14] Moreover, Hollander and Einwohner[15] emphasized that understanding the nature of resistance is crucial for considering the interaction between actors

6 Rwamahe Rutakumwa et al., "Conducting In-Depth Interviews with and without Voice Recorders: A Comparative Analysis," *Qualitative Research* 20, no. 5 (2020): 565–81, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794119884806.
7 David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 1. issued as paperback (Oxford University Press, 2003).
8 Harvey, *The New Imperialism*.
9 Robert Fletcher, "What Are We Fighting for? Rethinking Resistance in a Pewenche Community in Chile," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 28, no. 3 (2001): 37–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150108438774.
10 Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner, "Conceptualizing Resistance," *Sociological Forum* 19, no. 4 (2004): 533–54, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11206-004-0694-5.
11 Mikael Baaz et al., "Defining and Analyzing 'Resistance': Possible Entrances to the Study of Subversive Practices," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 41, no. 3 (2016): 137–53, https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375417700170.
12 Fletcher, "What Are We Fighting For?"
13 Baaz et al., "Defining and Analyzing 'Resistance.'"
14 Baaz et al., "Defining and Analyzing 'Resistance,'" 45–48.
15 Hollander and Einwohner, "Conceptualizing Resistance."

and targets. These arguments were supported by Young,[16] who believed that the interaction of structure and agency needs to be explored to understand the resistance.

3.2. Neoliberalism Encourages the Development of the Indonesian Extractive Regime

This section provided an overview of the development of the extractive regime in Indonesia, which led to the policy of iron sand mining plan in Kulon Progo. The Indonesian extractive regime emerged during the colonial period, coinciding with a shift in the composition of exported commodities. Gellert[17] proposes a categorization of the Indonesian extractive regime into two distinct periods: the initial "Cycle of Resource Nationalism" spanning from the 1950s to the 1970s, and the subsequent Cycle of Resource Nationalism from the 1980s to the 1990s. Indonesia's extractive regime in the post-colonial era was a non-liberal economy, set up by the synthesis of socialist and nationalist ideologies by Sukarno and authoritarianism under Suharto. Gellert[18] definitively shows how global, local and commodity-related factors interact to give rise to and propel extractive regimes in Indonesia. The goal was to nationalize resource ownership to facilitate progressive redistribution, industrial transformation, and collective action to rectify market prices

The period of early neoliberalism in Indonesia witnessed a robust extractive regime under the Old Order government and the New Order government. The first Cycle of Resource Nationalism began under the Old Order regime. The phenomenon of resource nationalism emerged in the context of anti-colonial movements. The Old Order government endeavored to establish a national economy by nationalizing plantation, oil, and agricultural industries that Dutch and other Western companies previously owned and disregarded international assistance. These policies gave rise to an economic predicament characterized by adverse growth, inflation, and a limited retreat from the international market.

In the New Order Era, the extractive regime experienced significant growth by exploiting various industries such as oil, timber, and minerals. It was in line with the neoliberalism phase. The inception of neoliberalism could be traced back to 1968, when Suharto initiated the liberalization of foreign investment policy, which resulted in the stabilization of inflation and the subsequent recovery of the economy. Furthermore, the Indonesian government engaged in the extraction of natural resources and utilized natural resource exports to bolster the country's economy. The administrative institution created a legal mechanism that gave great power to the central government to manage natural resources. During that period, extractive regimes were established by utilizing diverse natural resources. The mining industry became the first target. Various disputes occurred in natural resource-based industries, such as mining, plantations, and forestry. The reason is that the state needed to protect private property ownership by providing guarantees to private corporations and not recognizing various models of farmers' ownership of land.[19]

In the PPLP resistance case, the PPD was supported by the state to claim the coastal land as their private property. Once they had legalized the coastal land as their own (*Paku Alam Grond*), they could manage their land as they want, including using the land for industrial purposes, probably to accommodate mining activities on the coastal land.

This research viewed the mining policy in Kulon Progo as part of the extractive regime's policy that exercised ABD manifested as coastal land issues. Land is one of the key factors of production in industrialization, and in this case, the ownership status of coastal land is the primary cause of conflict between coastal farmers and the government and the PPD. The government supported the PPD through policy

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[16] Graeme William Young, "Conceptualizing Resistance in Post-Conflict Environments," *International Peacekeeping* 22, no. 2 (2015): 169–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1017081.

[17] Paul K. Gellert, "Neoliberalism and Altered State Developmentalism in the Twenty-First Century Extractive Regime of Indonesia," *Globalizations* 16, no. 6 (2019): 894–918, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1560189.

[18] Paul K. Gellert, "Extractive Regimes: Toward a Better Understanding of Indonesian Development," *Rural Sociology* 75, no. 1 (2010): 28–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1549-0831.2009.00001.x.

[19] Ayu Pratiwi, "Kebijakan Ekonomi: Perspektif Ekonomi Politik Dalam Pembangunan di Indonesia," *Abiwara: Jurnal Vokasi Administrasi Bisnis* 3, no. 1 (2021): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.31334/abiwara.v3i1.1847.

establishment, particularly in land ownership to legalize the ownership status of the coastal land. The following section described the debate over coastal landownership between coastal farmers and the government.

3.3. The Discourse of Coastal Land Rights

This section illustrates how the configuration of power, encompassing state power and PPD power (as the structure), contributes to the claim of ownership over coastal land, thereby shaping the nature of the PPLP resistance (as the agency). The primary factor contributing to PPLP's resistance to the mining plan is the status of coastal land ownership. The coastal land in Kulon Progo Regency is located directly adjacent to the Indian Ocean, which lies approximately 17 kilometers from the Progo River in the east to the Glagah River in the west. The land is covered in the administrative area of three sub-districts: Galur, Panjatan, and Wates. It is administratively managed by six hamlets, which are Banaran and Karangsewu in the Galur Sub-district, Bugel and Pleret in the Panjatan Sub-district, and Garongan and Karangwuni in the Wates Sub-district. The coastal land is fertile sandy land used for farming and raising animals by the inhabitants. According to coastal farmers, coastal land is state-owned land cultivated for decades, making it their property. Conversely, the government argues that the coastal land belongs to the PPD. This section will explain each party's reasoning regarding coastal land ownership.

The PPLP insisted that they own coastal land because they have cultivated the land for many years. They argued that their argument was based on specifically Article 2 of the BAL 1960 to claim that coastal land is state-owned land that must be used to fulfill the welfare of the people. In addition, there are several legal bases related to the BAL, such as the Regional Regulation of the Yogyakarta Special Region (DIY) Province No. 5 of 1954, the Regional Regulation of the DIY Province No. 3 of 1984, and the provision of Article 24 Paragraph 2 of Government Regulation No. 24/1997 on Land Registration. Therefore, the PPLP disagreed with the government's statement that coastal land is the property of the PPD.

Before the BAL 1960 was enacted, the DIY government established the Regional Regulation of DIY Province Number 5 of 1954. This regulation allows the people of Yogyakarta to own the Sultanate or PPD lands if they had occupied the land for at least 20 years. Furthermore, there was the Regional Regulation of the DIY Province Number 3 of 1984 on implementing the Full Applicability of the BAL 1960 in the DIY Province. Moreover, the provision of Article 24 Paragraph 2 of Government Regulation No. 24/1997 on Land Registration has an adverse possession clause, which states that for those who, in good faith and honestly, physically control land for twenty consecutive years, the law will protect them and legitimize them as the owners of the land they control.

In addition to claims under the BAL, there are various arguments from coastal farmers who reject the PPD’s ownership of coastal land. Coastal farmers argue that coastal land has become productive as it is today because of their hard work clearing and cultivating it, turning it into agricultural land. They argue that the Paku Alam Duchy does not have a certificate of ownership of the coastal land and has never visited it, so how can they suddenly claim that the coastal land is theirs? Other farmers argue that they inherited the coastal land from their ancestors, who have traditionally used it as agricultural land. Additionally, some farmers assert that coastal land belongs to God, so that farmers are responsible for preserving the coastal environment and only using the land for agriculture purposes.

On the other hand, the government emphasized that coastal land is the property of the PPD. Discussions regarding land in Yogyakarta cannot be separated from UUK Yogyakarta 2012. Land is one of the five pillars regulated in the UUK Yogyakarta 2012. Unlike other provinces in Indonesia, the land in the Yogyakarta region consists of privately owned land, state-owned land, and land owned by the Sultanate (Keraton Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and Puro Pakualaman). Following the introduction of the UUK in 2012, the Regional Regulation of the DIY Province Number 5 of 1954 was no longer valid.

In Kulon Progo Regency, land ownership status referred to an old map created in 1938 by the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government. Based on this old map, the land in the Yogyakarta region consists of the Yogyakarta Sultanate's land, village use rights land, and land with private property rights. In the practice of applying for a certificate, the regulation collides with the recognition of the Yogyakarta Sultanate's *domeinverklaring* (*risjksblad*) 1918, which states that the Yogyakarta Sultanate would take ownership of unclaimed land (no man's land).[20] Furthermore, explanation number 2 of the Regional Regulation of the Province of DIY Number 3 of 1984 on the Implementation of the Full Applicability of the BAL 1960 in the DIY Province stated that long before the establishment of the DIY Province, various laws and regulations had been enacted and regulated in the field of agrarian affairs as contained in the Sultanate *Rijksblad* (national gazette) and Paku Alaman *Rijksblad*, which, based on Article 4 paragraph (4) of Law No. 3 of 1950, remain in force. This legal basis was a reference for the government, indicating that coastal land belongs to the PPD.

The old map from 1938 was part of the history of the establishment of Yogyakarta. The long journey of Yogyakarta's formation began with the collapse of the Islamic Kingdom of Mataram in Central Java after the death of Sultan Agung (1613-1645). Various political upheavals occurred in various regions during the subsequent reigns (the reigns of Amangkurat I, Amangkurat II, Amangkurat III, Pakubuwono I, Amangkurat IV, and Pakubuwono II). Internal conflicts within the Kingdom arose between Pakubuwana III and Prince Mangkubumi. The Kingdom's leaders sought assistance from the VOC to address the chaos. The VOC (the Dutch) used the opportunity to interfere with governance in Mataram Islam in 1754. The VOC invited Pakubuwana III and Prince Mangkubumi to divide the Mataram Kingdom, resulting in the Giyanti Agreement on 13 February 1755. The agreement divided the Kingdom of Mataram Islam into two territories: the Surakarta Sultanate and the Ngayogyakarta Sultanate (Yogyakarta).[21] Prince Mangkubumi established the Kingdom of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat in Yogyakarta and took the Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono (SSHB) I title. In the following years, various disturbances occurred within the Kingdom, including the Geger Sepehi, which the British East India Company (BEIC) exploited — replacing the VOC. The Geger Sepehi occurred due to internal conflicts between the two sons of SSHB, namely Prince Soendoro (SSHB II) and Prince Notokusumo.

The BEIC and Prince Notokusumo won the rebellion, so the BEIC crowned Prince Notokusumo as Gusti Pangeran Adipati Paku Alam (GPA Paku Alam I) and gave him land. GPA Paku Alam I established the Paku Alaman Duchy (PPD) in June 1812. When GPA Paku Alam passed away, his line was continued by his son Sri Paku Alam II. The BEIC granted him land in the Karang Kemuning area, specifically the Urut Sewu dunes in the coastal region, stretching from the Progo River estuary to the Bogowonto River estuary. The area known as the Adikarto Regency, now called the Kulon Progo Regency, belongs to the PPD.[22] The Urut Sewu dunes are coastal or Paku Alaman land (*Paku Alaman Grond*/PAG). When the Dutch East Indies Government returned, they created an old map, assigned plot numbers to the map, and distributed the land to villages. In 1918, the Sultan legislated *Risjksblad* Number 16 for the Sultanate land and *Risjksblad* Number 18 for the PPD land to reorganize lands in Yogyakarta. The law states that all land without proof of ownership belongs to the king. Since the land in Yogyakarta consists of the Sultanate land, the PPD land, the people's land, and the government land, following the 1918 land reorganization under the Sultanate *Rijksblad* and the PPD *Rijksblad*, the *Sultanate Grond* belongs to the Sultanate and the Duchy institutions. This land is referred to as the Sultanate Land and the PPD land.

In November 2024, the DIY Government held a Sultanate Land Exhibition. The exhibition presented the chronology of the history of sultanate land, which includes sultanate land and PPD land. The content was summarized in the Table 1.

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[20] Warsito, "Politik Tanah Sultan (Menjaga Keberlangsungan Keraton Dan Ekonomi Rakyat Miskin)," *Sanaamul Quran : Jurnal Wawasan Keislaman* 1, no. 1 (2022): 20, https://doi.org/10.62096/sq.v1i1.2.

[21] Harto Juwono, *Hak Milik Atas Tanah: Memahami Sistem Agraria Di Era Hindia Belanda* (Selaklali, 2023).

[22] Harto Juwono, "Concession Right in Javanese Principality: A Mining Case in Kulon Progo," *Patrawidya* 13, no. 1 (2011): 6.

Table 1. The history of the Yogyakarta Sultanate land and the Paku Alaman Duchy land

Year	Significant Event
1755	**The Giyanti Agreement** The agreement divided the Mataram Islamic Kingdom into the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Sultanate of Surakarta. The Yogyakarta Sultanate was given the right to manage land in its territory called Sultan *Grond*, which was then managed and inherited by the royal family.
1811	**The British occupation and the beginning of *Geger Sepehi*** The British took over Java in 1811 and changed some policies. The Yogyakarta Sultanate retained its land. High taxes fueled conflict in the community, which led to riots (Geger Sepehi) in 1812. The SSHB II tried to protect the rights of the Sultanate but was oppressed by the Dutch.
1816	**The Dutch re-occupation** The Dutch reoccupied Indonesia and imposed a new administrative system. The Yogyakarta Sultanate had to adjust its land management according to Dutch regulations, but it maintained its privileges over royal lands.
1870	**The agrarian reform** The Yogyakarta Sultanate undertook agrarian reforms to increase the productivity of royal land. The Sultanate managed its land effectively by introducing land lease regulations.
1918	**Establishment of the Sultanate land and the PPD land** The Dutch officially recognized Sultanate *Grond* as land owned by the Yogyakarta Sultanate through the Sultanate *Rijksblad* No. 16 of 1918 and *Rijksblad* Paku Alaman of 1918 No. 18 which recognized Paku Alaman *Grond* as land owned by the PPD. Both types of land cannot be sold but can be leased to the community as needed.
1942	**The Japanese Occupation** The Japanese recognized the Sultanate's land rights, but the Japanese government used much of the land for war and food production. Control over the royal lands was maintained because SSHB IX maintained good relations with the Japanese
1945	**Yogyakarta joined the Republic of Indonesia** After Indonesia's independence in 1945, SSHB IX and SPA VIII declared that Yogyakarta would join the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) through a September mandate. SSHB IX and SPA VIII retained the royal land rights as part of the royal wealth.
1950	**Recognition of Yogyakarta's status as a special region** In 1950, the Indonesian government recognized Yogyakarta as the Special Region in accordance with Law No. 3 of 1950 concerning the establishment of the DIY. This recognition reinforced the position of the Sultanate and the PPD as the entity authorized to regulate land in its territory. It confirmed the special relationship between Yogyakarta and the Republic of Indonesia.
1960	**Basic Agrarian Law (BAL)** In 1960, the government of the Republic of Indonesia enacted the BAL, which granted land ownership rights to citizens. However, the Sultanate and PPD lands were still treated as royal lands and were not included in the general rules of the Basic Agrarian Law.
1984	**Management arrangement of the Sultanate land and the PPD land** The DIY government introduced the DIY Governor Regulation on the right of lease and right of use granted to the public or institutions that wanted to use the land of the Sultanate and Paku Alaman Duchy with a management system based on public interest and economic development.
2012	**The Yogyakarta Specialness Law** The DIY government passed the Yogyakarta Specialness Law (Undang-Undang Keistimewaan/UUK Yogyakarta 2012) to strengthen the rights of the Sultanate and the PPD over land management in the DIY area. This law ensured that royal lands remain legally recognized in the context of a modern state.
2024	**Land management challenges** Royal land management faced new challenges, such as community land use conflicts, urban development needs, and investor involvement. Therefore, the Sultanate and the PPD introduced a more modern and organized approach to land management to ensure that royal land remained a strategic asset and was used as widely as possible for the community's benefit.

Source: The Sultanate Ground Exhibition, 14 – 16 November 2024.

Differences in the legal basis for coastal landownership have given rise to differing views on coastal landownership. The government seeks to legalize *Sultanate Grond* and *Paku Alam Grond* through a series of regulations to support the certification of Sultanate and PAG land. On the other hand, coastal land farmers are striving to maintain their resistance against government policies that would take over coastal land from them.

From the ABD perspective, PPD's claim over coastal land as its own is a form of ABD. The PPD uses colonial maps to claim coastal land and receives support from the government through official regulations that back the claim. The government and the PPD's failure to enforce coastal land ownership regulations firmly has led farmers to resist.

3.4. The PPLP Resistance

Understanding the nature of the PPLP resistance, which stems from coastal land ownership discourses, this section explained the PPLP resistance in greater detail. The resistance of coastal land farmers began in 2006, when the Kulon Progo Regency Government and PT Jogja Magasa Mining, Ltd (JMI) announced the iron sand mining plan in the southern coastal villages of Kulon Progo Regency. To communicate the mining plan, the government conducted announcement events in coastal villages. The coastal farmers boycotted the events. To strengthen resistance, coastal land farmers formed the Coastal Land Farmers Union (PPLP) on April 2007. Since then, the spectrum of resistance was collective and organized resistance. The PPLP conducted various actions against the mining plan, such as demonstrations, public hearings and communal prayers (*mujahadah*). The chronicle of the resistance was summarized in the following table.

Table 2. The Chronicle of The PPLP's Struggle

Date	Action
1 April 2007	The coastal farmers group from 10 villages in 4 sub-districts initiated the PPLP.
27 August 2007	The PPLP conducted a protest at the Kulon Progo DPRD Office demanding the cancellation of the mining plan project.
4 February 2008	The coastal community held an audience with Commission VII of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and the Australian Embassy asking for clarity on the identity of PT Indo Mines, Ltd. (PT JMI).
1 March 2008	The Bugel residents blocked the road to the beach area to block the transportation of materials to the Pilot Plan PT JMI.
20 October 2009	The public consultation of the ANDAL (*Analisis Dampak Lingkungan Hidup*/Environmental Impact Assessment) train by PT JMI did not accommodate the aspirations of the affected people, resulting in chaos.
April 2010	Coastal communities sent a statement of rejection of the iron sand mining plan to the President of the Republic of Indonesia.
May 2010	Coastal communities sent a letter to the Yogyakarta DPRD demanding that the Yogyakarta DPRD investigate alleged legislative scandals in the process of drafting Regional Regulation No. 2 of 2010 concerning the 2009-2019 DIY RTRWP by the Governor of Yogyakarta Province.
June 2010	Coastal communities sent a letter to the DPRD to propose the cancellation of Regional Regulation No. 2 of 2010[23] which violated Permendagri No. 28 of 2008.[24]
15 December 2010	The grand meeting rejecting the iron sand mining plan coincided with the assessment of the ANDAL Train document in Bugel Village.
16 December 2010	The residents' action stopped the disturbing actions carried out by Pakualam individuals in Bugel.
3 – 6 June 2008	The KOMNAS HAM investigated and examination of the iron sand mining plan and recommended that the mining plan could trigger human rights violations, namely land rights, the right to work, the right to security, the right to information, and the rights of farmers.
21 July 2008	3000 PPLP members demonstrated at UGM demanding the termination of post-mining land reclamation cooperation by the Faculty of Forestry UGM and PT JMI. This demand was later approved.
27 October 2008	A mob from outside the conflict area attacked and burned 7 PPLP posters and 1 house belonging to coastal residents.

[23] Regional Regulation (Perda) of the Special Region of Yogyakarta Province Number 2 of 2010 concerning the Spatial Planning of the Special Region of Yogyakarta Province for 2009-2029

[24] Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 28 of 2008 concerning Procedures for Evaluating Draft Regional Regulations on Regional Spatial Planning

Date	Action
23 – 25 October 2008	Coastal communities demonstrated at the Kulon Progo DPRD Office to demand the cancellation of the iron sand mining plan because it had the potential to violate human rights.
19 July 2009	PPLP held a meeting at the LBH to discuss a case of criminalization against one of the coastal residents.
17 December 2010	PPLP closed the PT JMI Pilot Project in Trisik Beach after 3 years of operation.
9 February 2011	Mediation by the KOMNAS HAM in Bugel, resulted in a deadlock and a recommendation for further mediation among the related parties.

Source: Asmara Artzine.[25]

In 2014, the Yogyakarta Provincial Government postponed the mining plan indefinitely because the government needed to find an appropriate investor. However, the PPLP continued their resistance in rejecting the mining plan and potential policies that will grab coastal land. Resistance was conducted by organizing the PPLP anniversary every year to maintain coastal farmers' solidarity. The PPLP changed their resistance strategy after the mining postponement. It shows that the temporal aspect influences the PPLP resistance. The PPLP tried to adjust its resistance strategy by referring to the changes that occurred.

Moreover, PPLP resistance could be observed from how the organization works or how the relationship of the body (the PPLP as the organization) with the representation (the members) was formed. PPLP was an organization that served as a forum for coastal farmers to resist the mining plans. PPLP was initiated by the leaders of farming groups in coastal areas after the announcement of the mining plan, which caused farmers to worry about losing their coastal land. These concerns grew when external parties entered the coastal area to provide information that, in various regions of Indonesia, mining had damaged the environment and harmed the surrounding communities. In response to the coastal farmers' concerns, the leaders of the farming groups in the coastal area held discussions that resulted in an agreement that the coastal farmers would reject the mining plan for the following reasons. The reasons were that agricultural cultivation on the coastal land, which has been managed for decades, can improve the welfare of the coastal community.

Meanwhile, mining would divert the coastal land from agricultural use and damage the environment. The meeting also decided to establish the PPLP as an organization to fight against the mining plans. In its development, the PPLP has united and mobilized solidarity among coastal farmers. The PPLP's resistance grew stronger after the government issued a mining contract for JMI in November 2008. According to the PPLP, the contract benefits investors more than the Indonesian government.

PPLP was a community organization with a community structure (*gemeinschaft*), making it informal in nature. The organizational structure of PPLP consists of a chairperson, secretary, treasurer, and field coordinators. Field coordinators consist of village coordinators and hamlet coordinators. The chairperson of PPLP was responsible for coordinating the field coordinators, assisted by the secretary and treasurer. The field coordinators were responsible for raising funds and mobilizing PPLP members in various activities, as well as responding to issues that threaten coastal agriculture. In addition, the PPLP management was responsible for organizing meetings and celebrating PPLP's anniversary every year. PPLP was independent, so all resistance activities were funded by PPLP members themselves, without relying on external assistance. Fundraising was conducted on an ad hoc basis when the PPLP planned to hold resistance activities, such as the anniversary celebration. The field coordinator visits each household to collect funds in amounts agreed upon during PPLP meetings. Some coastal farmers allocate the benefit of the collective chili market to the PPLP's resistance fund. The fund is used to support the PPLP activities.

The management of the PPLP organization was fluid and flexible. All PPLP members had the same rights to participate in PPLP activities. Coastal farmers who are aware of the importance of the PPLP struggle actively participated in its management. As a result, although there were active administrators and members

[25] Bodhi IA and Kolektif Nyalakan Project, eds., *Asmara Art Zine 03: Riwayat Pemakan Pasir* (Asmara Art and coffeeshop, 2024).

in each village, there was no institutional regeneration within the PPLP management structure. Some PPLP administrators claimed that PPLP administrator regeneration was already underway, but the administrative structure had not been updated. This institutional flexibility could have both positive and negative impacts on their resistance. The positive impact was that all PPLP members had the same rights to join the PPLP management, allowing regeneration to occur organically. The negative impact was that there was no clear distribution of responsibilities within the PPLP institution. This situation could weaken the institutional structure of the movement and exacerbate divisions between older and younger generations. This management flexibility has led to factions within the PPLP. Older generations were reluctant to interfere in the management carried out by younger generations because it was difficult to discuss matters. As a result, some resistance strategies adopted by younger generations conflict with the values upheld by older generations.

There was dualism in the management of PPLP. First was the difference in the nature of resistance between the older and younger generations. The older generation had a compromising nature of resistance. They are willing to discuss with the government and avoid anarchic resistance. The older generation maintained PPLP's independence to prevent other parties from controlling it. In contrast, the younger generation emphasized a progressive character and was sometimes anarchic. They were unwilling to compromise with the government and are very open to collaboration with external parties, especially artists. This difference in resistance character was expressed during the annual PPLP anniversary celebrations. Before the anniversary event, the older generation was invited to discuss with the police, and they agreed that the PPLP convoy should not use motorcycles with loud exhaust pipes and should not pass through provincial roads. The older generation always reminded the younger generation, as the convoy organizers, of this agreement. However, this agreement was always violated. The younger generation always used loud exhaust pipes for the convoy, causing noise pollution. They planned the convoy route through provincial roads. The younger generation disregarded the messages from the older generation. Furthermore, they were reluctant to interact with the government and did not participate in government activities. For example, they chose to abstain in general elections and adopted a pessimistic attitude toward government development policies.

The resistance characteristics of PPLP could be categorized into four types. First, they strongly rejected mining and were anti-government. Most of the younger generation had this resistance characteristic; they were not farmers' group leaders, so they did not have much interaction with the government. Second, they strongly rejected mining but were cooperative with the government. They were the older generation and were leaders of farmer groups who received a lot of agricultural assistance from the government. Third, they strongly opposed mining and were not close to the government but were friendly towards the government. They were the younger generation that was involved in the management of farmer groups. Fourth, they stood on two sides: PPLP and the government. They were the older generation, which was close to government officials and received a lot of assistance from the government.

From a religious perspective, the differences in character between the older and younger generations of PPLP could be dichotomized into religious (*santri*) and secular (*abangan*). The older generation tended to adopt a religious-like attitude, relying on religious channels and compromise. Meanwhile, the younger generation tended to be close to artists who were anarchic in style and not close to religious elements. This character was reflected in the social life of coastal residents in general. One PPLP informant categorized the character of coastal communities as religious, secular, and anti-government. Those who were religious were residents who diligently performed religious rituals, were affiliated with religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and were generally close to the government. Those who were secular were residents who did not perform religious rituals and tended to keep their distance from the government. Meanwhile, those who were anti-government were PPLP members who strongly opposed mining and were reluctant to interact with the government.

Characterization was evident within the PPLP organization. The dissemination of information about the existence of PPLP was largely carried out by artists, the only organization accepted by PPLP and involved in

many resistance activities. Artists exposed several PPLP administrators through their works, such as books, zines, posters, and paintings. There were two PPLP officials heavily documented by artists, namely Mr. X and Mr. Y (pseudonyms). Mr. X is the spokesperson for PPLP, who disseminated PPLP's struggle at the local, national, and international levels. Artists documented Mr. X's track record through the publication of books, zines, posters, and anti-mining paintings. The zines titled *Bertani atau Mati* (Farm or Die) and *Dialog Wong Cubung* (Dialogue of the Peasant) imply a strong characterization of Mr. X. Although Mr. X passed away, the artist continued to highlight Mr. X at every PPLP anniversary celebration. Meanwhile, Mr. Y's exposure has intensified since Mr. X's passing. Mr. Y was a PPLP member who was once imprisoned for allegedly insulting the police while expressing resistance. Mr. Y frequently appeared to deliver resistance speeches at every PPLP event and adopted a resistant stance toward the government and external parties.

On the other hand, the older generation, who were the leaders of farmer groups and coastal community leaders, chose to operate underground and never exposed themselves. During the mining plan conflict, they devised strategies and coordinated with various parties that supported the PPLP's resistance, including compromising with the government so that there would be no riots when the PPLP staged protests. Informants who were PPLP elites explained that when the conflict arose, the PPLP delegated tasks to its administrators. Mr. X was assigned to the external affairs to disseminate the PPLP's resistance to the public. Meanwhile, several administrators were tasked with internal affairs, uniting the coastal community to oppose mining and approaching the government. At that time, they chose to adopt a passive stance and observe the PPLP's activities carried out by the younger generation. They were more focused on empowering farmers through farming groups. This is how the older generation reinforced new resistance performance as they preferred to resist in silence.

For this reason, they maintained an open stance toward the government, particularly the Agriculture Department, which had significantly supported coastal agricultural development. The older generation's harsh expressions of resistance could endanger the PPLP organization. The characterization of PPLP impacted on its public image. Artists portrayed PPLP from the perspective of the young generation, which was hardline and resistant. Thus, there was a duality within the PPLP organization. The character and characterization within PPLP influenced their resistance strategies.

From the description, it could be concluded that the PPLP was able to sustain its resistance for eighteen years and so forth because they exercised overt and covert resistance and developed a fluid relationship in their organization among their management and members. The PPLP operated many overt and covert forms of resistance as part of their strategies. They encouraged farmers to reach their goals to sustain the coastal land for agriculture. Furthermore, they developed PPLP as a resistance organization and determined their resistance character. For example, they promoted independent resistance organizations that were able to fund their activities because they had strong solidarity.

4. Conclusion

The solidarity and consistency of the PPLP's resistance demonstrated the strength of grassroots movements in opposing policies that exploit natural resources (extractivism). In this case, ABD was carried out by the private sector, supported by the state and local aristocrats who claimed ownership of coastal land. The extractive regime advocated by the state gave rise to various policies to support the mining plans. However, various strategies to seize the coastal farmers' living space were successfully thwarted because of the solidarity in the PPLP. The PPLP's resistance demonstrated that grassroots communities could prevail against state and private sector efforts to accumulate by dispossession in many cases of repression against similar resistance movements across Indonesia. The PPLP proved that resistance from below was not easy and needed to be flexible to accommodate many interests. The resistance could be successful if communities were organized and movement solidarity was maintained.

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